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EXPERIMENTS IN FARMERS’ COLLECTIVES IN EASTERN INDIA AND NEPAL:
PROCESS, BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES
Abstract
Do farmers’ collectives which pool land, labour, capital and skills to create medium-
sized production units, offer a more viable model of farming for resource constrained 
smallholders? A participatory action-research project in eastern India and Nepal 
provides notable answers. Groups of marginal and tenant farmers, catalysed by the 
project, evolved into four different collective models with varying levels of cooperation, 
gender composition, and land ownership/tenancy status. Based on three years of action-
research, this paper examines how the models evolved and their differential outcomes. 
All groups have gained from cultivating contiguous plots in their efficiency of labour 
and machine use for land preparation and irrigation, and from economies in input 
purchase. Several collectives of tenant farmers have also enhanced their bargaining 
power vis-a-vis an entrenched landlord class, and thus been able to negotiate lower rents 
and refuse longstanding feudal obligations. However, the models differ in their extent of 
economic gain and their ability to handle gender inequalities and conflicts over labour 
sharing. The paper explores the historical, regional, and cultural factors which could 
explain such differences across the models. It thus offers unique insights into the 
processes, benefits and challenges of farmers’ collectives, and provides pointers for 
replication and further research.
Key words: 
farmers’ collectives; group farming; Participatory Action Research; Eastern India; Nepal
1. INTRODUCTION
Across South Asia, small and marginal farmers are facing new patterns of stress. Pressures 
include high levels of landlessness and growing inequality, dwindling plot sizes, and fragmented 
holdings. This is set against a backdrop of climate change, limited non-farm earning options, and 
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a feminization of agriculture (Agarwal, 2019a; Sugden et al., 2014). Government responses to 
growing farmer distress have been far from adequate. In India, for instance, in recent years, most 
state governments have favoured farm loan waivers and minimum support prices, rather than 
investments in irrigation or other long-term measures for increasing production, or strengthening 
the institutional structure of farms (Agarwal, 2019a). 
For small and marginal farmers who have limited access to formal credit and are often 
net buyers of foodgrains, loan waivers and support prices bring little relief. What they need is to 
make farming itself viable by raising productivity. In this context, the case made by a few 
researchers, and especially Agarwal (2010a, 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c), for promoting 
collectives of smallholders, where farmers voluntarily pool their individually limited land, 
labour, capital and skills to create larger units of production, appears especially compelling. 
Agarwal (2014) argues, for instance, that a group approach to cultivation can involve 
varying levels of cooperation, ranging from ‘single purpose minimal cooperation’, such as joint 
marketing of output while farming individually, to ‘multipurpose limited cooperation’ with joint 
crop planning, equipment purchase and input procurement, and further to ‘multi-purpose, 
comprehensive cooperation’ where all inputs, including labour, are pooled and all output is 
shared. It is the last which, she notes, can bring the most benefit in terms of productivity and 
profits, by enlarging farm size, providing scale economies in machine and land use, enabling 
savings on labour and input costs, and enhancing the smallholder’s bargaining power in land and 
other markets.  She also finds empirical support for such gains in her detailed field survey and 
analysis for Kerala, India, with some cautionary lessons from her similar analysis for Telangana 
(Agarwal 2018). In recent decades, although there have been small experiments in group farming 
in South Asia, none to our knowledge have led to the creation of as large a number of group 
farms as found in Kerala and Telangana, or have been studied as systematically as in Agarwal 
(2018, 2019b, 2019c). The process of group creation and evolution has been even less mapped.
Hence the experiments with group farming undertaken through an Action Research 
Project (henceforth termed the Project), launched in South Asia by a consortium of local and 
international research institutes in 2015, are of particular relevance. These experiments are the 
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focus of this paper. That the local context of the Project is very different from that of Kerala and 
Telangana studied by Agarwal is also important in assessing the potential for replicating the 
model in diverse conditions. The idea for this project emerged in 2013, when a field team from 
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), which was engaged in climate change 
research in the Eastern Gangetic Plains of Bihar (India) and Nepal, was developing a larger 
research proposal on socially sustainable dry season irrigation technologies. In this context, we 
noted the livelihood insecurity of tenant farmers, who constituted a notable proportion of the 
region’s farmers. One of the NGO partners for this research—Sakhi Bihar—already had over a 
decade of experience in setting up fishery collectives with poor women in Madhubani district 
(Bihar), with positive economic returns. The IWMI team along with Sakhi decided to apply this 
model to agriculture, on the premise that pooling owned or jointly leased land and labour, and 
managing irrigation equipment provided by the Project, would improve the livelihoods of pure 
tenants (those who own no land and cultivate only leased in land), marginal farmers and women 
farmers, by increasing their bargaining power vis-a-vis landlords, and enabling them to use land, 
labour, machines and other resources more efficiently. 
The team then initiated a dialogue with the NGO Centre for the Development of Human 
Initiatives (CDHI) on the potential for pursuing a similar model in West Bengal. The entire 
experiment was further influenced by Agarwal’s 2010 paper, which outlined the experience of 
collective farming globally—from post-socialist countries to grassroots initiatives in South 
Asia—and advocated a new model of group farming, grounded in small scale, voluntary, and 
participatory units of production. The establishment of group farms was thus integrated by 
IWMI, the University of Southern Queensland and a network of government and NGO partners 
(hereafter called the Project Team)1 into a larger proposal for an action research project 
‘Improving Dry Season Irrigation for Marginal and Tenant Farmers on the Eastern Gangetic 
Plains’. It covered parts of Nepal, Bihar and northern West Bengal (henceforth termed North 
Bengal). Funded by the Australian Centre of International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), the 
Project began in late 2014.
1 The Government partners included North Bengal Agricultural University (Uttar Banga Krishi Viswavidyalaya), the 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), and the Department of Irrigation and Groundwater Resources 
Development Board in Nepal. The NGO partners were the International Development Enterprise in Nepal (with the 
support of the Krishak Samuha Sangh), CDHI in West Bengal, and Sakhi in Bihar.
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In mid-2015 a process was initiated to form farmers’ collectives in six villages, two each 
in Nepal, Bihar and North Bengal. The Eastern Gangetic plains are characterized by a high 
incidence of poverty,2 small-scale farming, limited commercialization, and high inequalities in 
land ownership, as well as highly unequal gender and caste relations (Sugden, 2017; Leder et al, 
forthcoming).  Food insecurity is substantial, and male out-migration leaves many women 
managing both farm work and housework under severe resource constraints. In addition, in the 
Nepal and Bihar sites we see a high dependence of landless and marginal farmers on leasing land 
through sharecropping from powerful landlords, while North Bengal deviates from this pattern 
due to the late-1970s land reforms undertaken by the government under its ‘Operation Barga’ 
programme, which enabled landless tenants to become small owner cultivators.
We use the term ‘collectives’ to describe the group farms catalysed by the Project, 
denoting high levels of cooperation, to differentiate them from ‘cooperatives’, a term used to 
denote a variety of organizations with varying levels of cooperation, and most typically single 
activities such as marketing. In the three regions, 16 collectives were formed, later increasing to 
20 as new groups emerged, some spontaneously. The initial groups were catalyzed by the 
Project, but through a bottom-up participatory process with farmers working to constitute models 
that they were most comfortable with. Four models of group farming thus emerged organically, 
differing in their extent of cooperation and dependence on land leasing. Within each model, 
groups also differed in their gender and age composition. Some were constituted only of men 
(young or middle-aged), others of only middle-aged women, and yet others of both genders and 
mixed ages. Some also changed in gender composition over time.
This paper is based on three years of intensive experimentation and research with these 
20 farmers’ collectives. (All but one of this paper’s authors worked on the Project.) It aims to 
understand the process and social dynamics of group formation and change, the benefits they 
have reaped so far, the challenges they have faced, and the lessons they provide for expansion 
and sustainability. Section 2 below outlines the potential of farmers’ collectives. Section 3 gives 
details of the Project site selection, a background to the sites, and the data collection process. 
Sections 4 and 5 respectively trace the evolution of the collectives, the diversity of models that 
emerged and why, and their management structures. Sections 6 and 7 outline the gains made, as 
2 The incidence of poverty is 39.5% in Nepal’s Saptari district (GoN, 2014), 45% in Bihar’s Madhubani district 
(ADRI, 2007), and 42% in North Bengal’s Cooch Behar district (GoI, 2010).
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well as the difficulties faced, especially in labour coordination, while Section 8 analyses why 
some collectives have been more successful in cooperation than others. The concluding section 9 
reflects on the lessons learnt, and provides pointers for future work on the project, as well as on 
the need for further research on group farming systems.  
It needs mention here that while there is a substantial body of empirical work on 
collective action around the commons, such as for protecting forests and water bodies,3 research 
on collective action around private property resources is sparse. Moreover, the theoretical 
insights from the commons literature cannot be applied automatically to farmers’ collectives 
constituted around private property. Increasing the number of empirical studies, including those 
in this paper, could in time provide the grist for such theory building. 
2. THE PROMISE OF FARM COLLECTIVES
Historically, collective farming systems have had a chequered history, given the often failed 
initiatives both in the socialist bloc and the 1960s and 1970s attempts in post-colonial developing 
countries to promote cooperative farming as part of their agrarian reform programmes. A 
complex set of factors (which cannot be detailed here) underlay the failures of these past efforts, 
both institutionally and in terms of productivity.  However, broadly, among the contributory 
factors were top-down, often coercive methods of implementation, very large sized farms, and 
large and heterogeneous groups, commonly involving both small and large farmers, despite their 
divergent interests within complex class structures (see variously, Robinson, 1967; Nove, 1969; 
and Lin, 1990 on the Socialist experience, and Apthorpe, 1972; Borda, 1971; Brass, 2007; 
Ghose, 1983; Harriss, 1980; and Scott, 1988 for the post-colonial 1960s-1970s examples; see 
also the overview in Agarwal 2010a). 
Shifts away from these features increased the chances of success. For example, even in 
Maoist China, Li (2018) demonstrates that collectives failed primarily when the state forcibly 
formed large farms where members lacked solidarity and a sense of belonging, and where 
3 Apart from Ostrom’s (1990) classic work, see also, Baland and Platteau (1996) for an overview of the literature; 
Agarwal’s (2010b) detailed empirical work from a gender perspective; and Craig et al. (2016) for a global 
assessment of evidence.
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remuneration was connected poorly with labour contributions. Subject to favorable ecological 
and external economic conditions, Chinese collectives performed relatively well when the groups 
were smaller and corresponded with existing communities and lineages with strong social ties.  
Similarly, group farms formed voluntarily by families and neighbours after de-collectivisation in 
some former socialist countries (such as Romania, East Germany, and Kyrgyzstan), to deal with 
land and machine scarcities, were more successful, both in cooperation and productivity (see e.g. 
Sabates-Wheeler 2002; Sabates-Wheeler and Childress 2004; and Mathijs and Swinnen 2001). 
Successful cases can also be found in European democracies (e.g. France: Agarwal and Dorin 
2018; and Norway: Almas, 2010). However, since the 1990s there has been a renewed interest in 
farmers’ collectives (especially all-women groups) in South Asia, manifested initially in sporadic 
regional initiatives (see Landesa, 2013 and Agarwal, 2003), and from the 2000s onwards, in 
more systematic efforts on a larger scale in south India (Agarwal 2018, 2019b, 2019c). 
These new initiatives have emerged from very different models to those that were tried in 
South Asia in the 1960s–1970s. They have built upon several decades of successful grassroots 
experience in promoting Self-Help Groups (SHGs); community groups cooperating for 
governing common pool resources, such as forests and water bodies; and collectives formed to 
better deliver health and education programmes (Agarwal 2009c). In particular, SHGs, of which 
there were 2.6 million in the mid-2000s, begun mostly by NGOs and most constituted of women 
only (Tanka 2012) provided a prototype.  Successful cooperation across such diverse contexts 
brought both experience and optimism, laying the ground for creating farmers’ collectives, even 
if the challenges of the high level of coordination group farming requires, remain. 
The potential advantages of voluntary bottom up smallholder collectives can be manifold 
(Agarwal 2010a). By farming in groups, marginal farmers can make large-scale investments and 
spread risk. Capital can be pooled for agricultural equipment such as tractors and irrigation pump 
sets – the latter to build climate resilience. This is important because individually it is not 
economical for very small farmers to purchase large machines, and the machine rental market is 
neither efficient nor equitable (reference?). Bulk purchase of inputs such as fertilizers can reduce 
costs. Most importantly, by collectively pooling land, a group can enlarge its farm size and 
operate a contiguous plot, thus allowing more efficient use of equipment and labour. Moreover, 
group farms can enhance the farmer’s bargaining power for leasing land on more favourable 
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terms – a benefit which would accrue particularly to women, who usually lack the power to 
strike favourable deals. In addition, group farming can facilitate labour saving, particularly in 
peak seasons. Group formation can also bring non-economic benefits in terms of capacity 
building and social and political empowerment for the poor, and especially women.
At the same time, there are also potential challenges in farming jointly, especially in 
managing labour time and ensuring that all group members contribute equally; as well as in 
terms of intra-group inequalities, say along gender and caste lines, which can create hierarchies 
in decision-making and interactions. These and related challenges, in turn, can undercut potential 
benefits. In which direction the effects move requires empirical examination. 
On productivity and profits, for instance, Agarwal (2018) carried out a large primary 
survey in Kerala and Telangana, and compared all-women group farms and individual family 
farms (95% of which were male-managed) in the same districts. She found that in Kerala, group 
farms relative to small individual family farms had five times higher net annual returns per farm, 
1.8 times the annual returns per hectare, and 1.8 times the annual value of output per gross 
cropped hectare, with substantially higher outputs for commercial crops such as bananas. 
However, paddy yields were lower in group farms than individual farms, since the groups could 
not easily lease in fertile paddy land which most male landowners chose to self-cultivate. The 
difference between food grains and other crops was also found in the Telangana results, where 
group farms relative to individual farms had a lower productivity for cereals but equivalent 
yields for cotton, and equivalent overall net returns per hectare, especially due to saving on hired 
labour. Small group size, commercial cropping, wider social networks, and institutional and 
government support structures were all found to matter for building successful and sustainable 
collectives.
We drew lessons from past research and past experiences when we catalysed the 
formation of farmers’ collectives in out project sites. At the same time, as outlined in Section 4, 
the farmers had a substantial say in shaping the models they felt would work for them and their 
contexts. And although we have not yet collected the kind of detailed data needed to assess the 
productivity and profits of farmers’ collectives—it is perhaps too soon to do so since the models 
Page 7 of 55 Journal of Agrarian Change
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
8
8
are still evolving—we do have information on the average yields of the major crops in the pre-
intervention and post-group formation periods as well as on the economic empowerment benefits 
of group formation. We also discuss the challenges faced so far in collective functioning, and 
trace the process through which different models of group farming have evolved. 
3.  THE SITES AND THEIR FEATURES
The Project covers two countries, four districts and six villages (Table 1), all located in the 
Eastern Gangetic Plains. Two villages are located in Nepal (Koiladi and Kanakpatti in Saptari 
district in the Terai-Madhesh region), and two each in the Indian states of Bihar (Bhagwatipur 
and Mahuyahi in Madhubani district) and North Bengal (Dholaguri in Cooch Behar district and 
Uttar Chakoakheti in the neighboring Alipurduar district). All three regions are highly dependent 
on agriculture and are economically and politically peripheral within their respective states. 
Saptari in Nepal and Madhubani in Bihar fall within two countries, but share a caste 
structure, economy and language (Maithili);  deeply entrenched semi-feudal class inequalities 
going back a long way historically; and exploitative landlord-tenant relations (Sugden and 
Gurung, 2012, Alden-Wily et al., 2008, Sugden, 2017). The North Bengal villages share some 
features in common with these two regions, but differ culturally and in their patterns of 
inequality, as discussed further below.
< Insert Table 1 here>
A census conducted in all six villages reveals high inequalities in land ownership (Tables 
2 & 3).  Over half the village households in Saptari (Nepal) and Madhubani (Bihar) are landless 
and just over 40% lease in land and cultivate as tenant farmers, typically on a 50:50 share-
cropping basis. Almost all the remaining farmers are marginal and small, owning less than 2 ha, 
although many of this group also lease in land to supplement their small holdings. Sixty-four per 
cent of the land across the two Madhubani villages and 60% in Satpari is under tenancy. Only 
3.8% of farmers in Saptari and 1.9% in Madhubani cultivate 2 ha or above, yet these few farmers 
respectively own 27% and 36% of the land. Saptari, in particular, also has absentee landowners 
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(owning an estimated 24% of the land), many of whom have moved to urban areas, but remain 
quite powerful in their villages of origin. Some 85% of the rented land in Kanakpatti, and over 
90% in Bhagwatipur and Mahuyahi is sharecropped on a 50:50 basis, the remaining being under 
fixed rent contracts with payments in kind which are usually a fixed amount of paddy or wheat. 
Although this is a drought-prone region, groundwater is available and shallow tubewells are 
widespread. However, sharecropping discourages investment, since half of any output increase 
due to irrigation would go to the landlord. Moreover, tenants are unlikely to bore tubewells in 
land that they do not own (see Sugden et al 2014, Sugden, 2012).  
<Tables 2,3,4  here>
The agrarian history of North Bengal until the 1960s was similar to that of Madhubani 
and Saptari: all came under the zamindari system in the colonial period. However, in West 
Bengal, under land reforms in the late-1970s, landless tenant farmers received land via the ‘land 
to the tiller’ policy, enabling them to become small peasant proprietors. This transformed 
agriculture in the state in many ways (Banerjee et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the problem of small  
fragmented holdings largely persisted, so that even in post-reform West Bengal, individual 
investments in irrigation remained unfeasible for most farmers. The land reforms also failed to 
address the glaring gender inequalities in land ownership (Gupta 1993). 
Unlike the Project villages in Nepal and Bihar, with their high degree of landlessness and 
dependence on tenancy, in North Bengal only 19% of land is under tenancy and only 16% of 
landless households and 18% of marginal land owners rent in land (Table 4). Most farmers 
cultivate a single paddy crop. A few rent pumpsets and tubewells for irrigation, although the 
much higher rainfall in this region allows some rainfed agriculture. 
The farmers in the study regions commonly operate three to four plots, usually on minute 
scattered fields (Table 5). In the Bihar sites, the average plot area is only 0.19 ha. Here, even 
landless tenants cultivate multiple plots, each averaging 0.17 ha. The baseline census data 
showed how households who both own and rent in land often cultivate 5 to 7 very small plots, 
renting land wherever available from several landlords. Plots for all farmers are on average 19 
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minutes walking distance from the house. The tiny scattered plots make investment in irrigation 
and the use of tractors difficult, and often even unfeasible. Hence, in the Bihar villages, group 
members reported that the amount of land cultivated in the dry winter season depended on how 
much residual monsoon moisture remained in the soil. Given the impracticalities and high costs 
of irrigation, large areas would be left fallow after the rice harvest till the next year’s rains. 
In Saptari (Nepal), similarly, most farmers operate two to three very small plots, and 
farmers renting land have to walk 19 minutes on average to reach their fields. In North Bengal, 
however, the number of plots operated are fewer, although plot sizes are similarly small. 
< insert Table 5 here>
In all three sites—Nepal, Bihar, and North Bengal—farmers are now facing stress due to 
climate change and rising costs of dies l and equipment (Sugden et al 2014). This further raises 
the already high barriers in accessing irrigation, and increases the farmers’ vulnerability to 
drought. Moreover, cyclical or long-term male out-migration has become a key component of 
livelihoods. In the Bihar and West Bengal sites men migrate to Indian cities, while in Saptari (as 
across Nepal) migration to the Gulf states and Malaysia is widespread (Sugden et al., 2016). 
Women are thus increasingly responsible for labour intensive agricultural tasks, and overseeing 
farm operations,4 while control over water and land remains with men. As a result, women’s 
workload, especially for female household heads, has increased greatly (Sugden et al., 2016).  
Agricultural and water-related programmes in the region, however, fail to address the structural 
barriers faced by women farmers (Leder et al., 2017).
These conditions provided fertile ground for the establishment of farmers’ collectives 
involving marginal landowners, pure tenants, and women farmers.
4 See, Adhikari and Hobley (2011), Maharajan et al., (2012), and Paris et al., 2005)
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4. FORMING THE COLLECTIVES AND INITIATING THE RESEARCH
Participatory action research and setting the groundwork:
In order to select suitable Project villages, a shortlist of settlements was prepared across the four 
districts, where the challenges facing smallholder agriculture were seen as representative of the 
larger region, based on government census data on landlessness and the extensive knowledge of 
local Project partners. After holding focus group discussions in each settlement, a ranking tool 
based upon key criteria was used to select the final six villages. In 2015 a census of every village 
household was then conducted in these six villages, to provide extensive livelihood data.  
Subsequent research followed after the ‘Action Research’ Project began. The process 
involved a cycle of planning, implementing the intervention, and evaluating the result. This 
Project sought to address decades of failed efforts to promote equitable intensification of 
agriculture in the Eastern Gangetic Plains by piloting innovative solutions through farmers’ 
collectives. The research team, however, took this a step further, by ensuring that the research 
was driven by the participants themselves (in this case the farmers) in a democratic model which 
gave them ownership over the knowledge produced – in keeping with the principles of 
Participatory Action Research (Pain et al., 2012, Mctaggart, 1991). Throughout the research 
process, therefore, we attempted to reduce the unequal relationship between participants and the 
Project team, through a cyclical process of engagement with the farmers. The farmers themselves 
shaped the design of the proposed collective models in each village, while regularly sharing their 
learning and the solutions they found throughout the piloting period.
Initial engagement with farmers began in mid-2015, through a series of community 
meetings to introduce the Project, assess the farmers’ perspectives on the socio-economic and 
technical challenges they face in agriculture, and discuss the potential for higher level 
cooperation to address some of these constraints. This was led by the project NGO partners, all 
of whom had worked extensively in the region for decades. Some of them were new to the 
specific project villages, and they invested time for social mobilization, while others (such as 
Sakhi in Bihar) had already worked in many of the project villages, and had established strong 
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trust and rapport with the community. An iterative process of engagement between the farmers 
and the research team was followed, which started with community meetings, and extended over 
several months (via farmer group meetings and day-to-day engagement with the Project team 
members).5 In these meetings, the merits, drawbacks, and practicalities of collectively organizing 
land, labour and capital were discussed. By the end of this process, we had identified several 
groups of participants interested in taking these ideas forward. 
During initial community consultations, it was clear that the farmers did not think it was 
problematic to establish multi-purpose medium cooperation, such as for joint irrigation and 
marketing. However, pooling labour and land was considered to be both difficult and risky, even 
while they recognized that it offered the potential for reaping the most benefit. It thus became 
clear to the Project team that flexible models were needed to take into account different land 
ownership regimes and the degree to which farmers were comfortable shifting from individual to 
group cultivation. Different groups thus ended up pursuing different levels of cooperation, as 
discussed further below. 
Under the guidance of the NGO partners, groups were formed on a voluntary basis by 
villagers who fell within the marginal farmer category. Priority was given to farmers owning 0.5 
or less, and in Bihar and Saptari, members of ten out of twelve groups depended mostly on 
tenancy. Women members were especially encouraged to join the experiment, since they were 
most affected by male out-migration. However, given that both men and women were interested, 
and group formation was largely farmer led, many mixed-gender groups emerged, particularly in 
North Bengal. Efforts were also made to enroll some farmers with demonstrated leadership 
ability or experience within each group, including those who were somewhat better educated and 
had broader social networks. This is important, since although groups with members from 
similar social or gender backgrounds can reduce possible conflicts, high homogeneity can 
narrow the social capital base of the group (as Agarwal, 2018 also finds in her research in Kerala 
and Telangana).
5 In all three sites, full time skilled research coordinators were appointed (one in each site). They spent most of their 
time in the villages and kept regular contact with the rest of the Project team. In Bihar, they even resided within one 
of the communities, near the main office of the NGO Project partner, Sakhi. The presence of these coordinators, and 
the strong base of the NGO partners in these communities allowed continuous interaction between the Project team 
and the farmers.
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Farmers had multiple motives for forming collectives, the most important being a 
recognition of the potential benefits of cooperation. But clearly it also helped that they would get 
access to ‘free’ irrigation technology, training in efficient water management, and support from 
the Project team for dry season vegetable production. Whether such an incentive is needed for 
replicating the model elsewhere needs further probing, and will be discussed in section 9 of the 
paper.  In terms of cooperation, many farmers recognized that sharing labour in groups could 
save time, increase the efficiency of labour use, and help raise productivity in ways not possible 
with individual farms. Observing the pilot farms also made a difference, since in Madhubani and 
North Bengal two new groups formed autonomously, and requested the Project team to play a 
facilitating role.
Four types of models
Given that the process of achieving higher levels of cooperation was essentially farmer-led in 
line with Participatory Action Research principles, a range of models evolved organically, 
depending especially on different land ownership regimes. In the Bihar and Nepal sites, given the 
large number of pure tenant farmers, and marginal landowners who also rent in additional land, 
the lease market was itself an entry point for encouraging group formation. Forming a group 
could increase the tenants’ bargaining power with landlords, while improved productivity could 
increase net returns after deducting the rent and other costs. It was required for groups to be on 
fixed rent contracts rather than sharecropping contracts, since past research from this region has 
shown that fixed rent tenancies offer greater benefits to tenants, as the tenant is awarded for any 
increase in productivity (Sugden and Gurung, 2012). Sharecropping reduces incentives, as the 
landlord takes a share of the increased effort and investments, facts which were ascertained 
during the baseline survey and discussions with the farmers.6 
6 While sharecropping can allow ‘risk’ sharing between landlords and tenants, these benefits only accrue if landlords 
also contribute to the costs of production. We found in our baseline survey, however, that landlords rarely contribute 
to the costs of irrigation or fertiliser. Farmers thus bear disproportionate losses if the crop fails.
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In the two North Bengal villages, by contrast, there was limited surplus land to lease for 
forming collectives. While some out-migrating farmers had rented out their land, the plots were 
generally small and already cultivated by tenants, and were not comparable to the large tracts 
belonging to (often absentee) landlords in Saptari (Nepal) or Madhubani (Bihar). In the North 
Bengal sites there were a few large farmers, while around two-thirds of the land belonged to 
smallholders with between 0.5 ha and 2 ha (Table 4). In this context, new mechanisms of 
cooperation were piloted, based upon smallholders pooling their own land rather than leasing 
land from others.
Overall, four models evolved, adapted to both the land ownership structure outlined 
above, the pre-existing willingness of farmers to manage different levels of cooperation, and 
their experience with working in groups over time. As of early 2018, the models which were 
established in each village are outlined in Table 5 and are discussed below. 
Model 1: Fully integrated cooperation with leased land.
In Bihar and Nepal, tenant farmers, who constituted a significant proportion of the farming 
population, were willing to engage in high levels of cooperation. Here the Project team, along 
with the farmers, developed a model whereby groups would lease in land collectively, farm it as 
a group, and share all costs and outputs. 
Model 2: Fully integrated cooperation with own plots. 
In North Bengal again groups were willing to take up a higher level of cooperation, but since 
there was little land for leasing, group members decided to consolidate their own plots to farm 
collectively. Most group members preferred to operate as a collective only in the dry season, 
although there were other forms of cooperation during the monsoon, such as labour exchange, 
and one of the all-women groups farmed collectively all year round.
In both Models 1 and 2, labour and output were shared, the only difference being that the land 
was leased in Model 1 and owned by group members in Model 2. 
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Model 3: Medium levels of cooperation with leased land.
The disinclination of farmers in some communities to pool labour paved the way for models 
involving medium levels of cooperation. In Bihar and Nepal, for example, some tenant farmers 
agreed to collectively lease a contiguous plot of land (as in Model 1) and cooperate for some 
activities including land preparation (e.g. ploughing), irrigation and marketing, and sometimes 
exchanging labour during busy spells, but decided to carry out other labour activities on their 
sub-plots individually, within the larger group plot. 
Model 4:  Medium levels of cooperation with owned land.
Among owner cultivators in Madhubani (Bihar), a fourth model evolved. Here marginal farmers 
owning their own fields pooled a contiguous area, and cooperated for land preparation, irrigation 
and input purchase, but not for sharing labour. Some of them had additional plots in other parts 
of the village, which they continued to cultivate individually.
 
Groups were free to shift from one model to another during the Project life cycle. For 
example, if the collective labour pooling became unmanageable under Model 1, the group could 
shift to Model 3. Similarly a group pursuing Model 2 could in theory re-constitute as Model 4. 
The reverse could also occur. If farmers were uncomfortable initially with collective labour 
pooling, they could begin farming individual sub-plots but shift to collective labour once the 
group became more cohesive.  We saw such shifts taking place in several cases during the 
Project period.
Some groups evolved into mixed models. Amongst two groups in Saptari (Nepal), for 
example, part of the leased land was set aside for individual farming under Model 3, and the 
remainder for group farming under Model 1. Similarly, in all but one of the sites in North 
Bengal, land was cultivated collectively during the dry season under Model 2, but cultivated 
individually during the monsoon season under Model 4.  This diversity of models is notable, and 
suggests the potential for adaptation to diverse conditions.
<Tables 5 near here>
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Data collection
A baseline census survey was carried out prior to the intervention, along with farmer interviews, 
to understand their livelihood trajectories. After the pilot, collectives were set up. Between 2015 
and 2019, a series of field visits were undertaken at different points in the crop cycle, to collect 
key information on challenges faced by the collectives in group management. This included two 
rounds of in-depth focus group discussions with the collectives, as well as interviews with 
individual members, at the end of 2016 and 2017. The discussions were based on a standardized 
guide that the Project team had prepared for collective reflection on the successes and challenges 
of the models. Further data were collected seasonally from each group on crop yields, costs, 
labour mobilisation, and irrigation throughout the Project life cycle, from the winter of 2015 till 
the winter of 2018. In February 2017, a meeting of group representatives from all 6 sites was 
held in Madhubani to reflect on the field experience and encourage cross-learning amongst 
participants. This meeting was also att nded by invited resource persons, such as Bina Agarwal, 
and course correction was introduced in some of the collectives. The insights provided by the 
field teams, based in each of the sites throughout the three year period were significant sources 
of additional information. 
5. GROUP CHARACTERISTICS AND MANAGEMENT 
As seen from Table 6, the groups range in membership from between 4 to 10 members. Of all the 
groups, five are women-only groups, three are men-only and 12 are mixed-gender. Among the 
latter, eight have one-third or more women and 5 have less than one-third women. It has been 
noted in the context of collective action around community forest protection groups in India and 
Nepal that a critical mass of 25-33% women makes a significant difference to women’s effective 
participation in the group and also to conservation outcomes (Agarwal 2010b). Hence, it would 
be interesting to examine, as the Project progresses, how well groups perform according to their 
gender composition, in terms of women’s participation and economic outcomes. In particular, 
the Uttar Chakoakheti Group 2 (North Bengal) initially had one woman with 6 landowning men, 
potentially creating a situation of unequal power relations between the lone female member and 
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the rest of the group. To overcome this imbalance, the group composition was subsequently 
changed by inviting one more woman to join the group.
The Nepal groups are all constituted of Adivasi (indigenous) or Dalit communities, the 
Bihar groups are all-Dalit or a mix of Dalits and Other Backward Castes (OBCs)7, with one 
being a predominantly Muslim group. The North Bengal groups are either all tribal or 
Rajbanshis.8 In other words, by ethnicity or caste, there is a substantial homogeneity within each 
group. 
<insert Table 6 near here>
After land pooling, the average plot size of the groups was 0.56 ha in Nepal, 1.61 ha in 
Bihar, and 1.44 ha in North Bengal, substantially larger than the average plots cultivated by 
individual farmers (see Table 7). These are all single contiguous plots created by the 
consolidation of multiple smaller plots after the intervention. Before intervention, as already 
noted, the farmers were cultivating several small plots.  
<insert Table 7 near here>
All groups have a management committee with a chairperson, secretary and treasurer. 
They normally convene monthly meetings, but meet more frequently during peak periods in the 
agricultural cycle. For Models 1 and 2, which share all labour, meetings are held to plan labour 
and input contributions and the division of tasks for current and future crop cycles. Most 
members also cultivate their own plots on the side. Usually group members agree upon a date 
and time to complete a required task collectively, although one-off tasks such as going to 
purchase inputs are allocated to members on an ad hoc rotating basis. Most groups do not have a 
system to record labour input by different members, but given their small size and the fact they 
know each other well, it is possible to largely ensure equal work contributions, although some 
challenges remain, as discussed in section 7.
7 Other Backward Castes (OBC) is a Government of India classification for certain caste groups which are 
historically disadvantaged, but not considered Dalits.
8 Rajbanshis are an indigenous ethnic group from North Bengal; and although they are classified in India as a 
‘Scheduled Caste’, they are not part of any pre-existing caste system, unlike in Nepal where Rajbanshis were 
integrated into the state sanctioned caste system of the nineteenth century. 
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For Models 3 and 4, the meetings focus on shared tasks requiring cooperation, such as 
managing irrigation equipment. They also jointly plan cropping patterns, and discuss when to 
irrigate and what inputs and techniques to use. 
In all the groups, members make monthly contributions to a group fund. All the farmers 
in a group contribute equally. Contributions range from NPR 100 in Nepal to INR 100 in India,9 
with some variation between the models. Additional contributions are sought if needed. The 
groups use the fund to cover production costs. In Models 1 and 2, the group fund is used to cover 
land preparation, maintenance of equipment and purchase of inputs such as fertiliser, and diesel 
or electricity for pumps. In Models 3 and 4, most input costs are covered by individual farmers 
and the group fund is used to cover the costs of land preparation and maintaining the pumpset.10 
Since the groups have contiguous plots, tractor ploughing becomes more feasible and is 
sometimes covered by the group fund. After ploughing, farmers in Models 1 and 2 meet at pre-
arranged times for key activities such as sowing, transplanting, weeding, and harvesting. In 
Models 3 and 4, farmers are responsible for their own plots after initial land preparation, with 
partial cooperation on some additional activities. 
In all four models, farmers cooperate for irrigation. Groups have access to a variety of 
equipment, including solar, diesel and electric pumps, which were provided as part of the 
technical work package of the Project. Water allocation is straightforward for Models 1 and 2, as 
all the land is irrigated simultaneously for each crop. For Models 3 and 4, farmers must allocate 
the water in turns to their subplots, based on need. 
Under Model 1 (the pure lease collective), the fixed rent is deducted directly from the 
final output, either in kind or in cash (after selling the crop). For Model 2 in North Bengal, where 
small owner cultivators have pooled their own plots, a ‘rent’ needs to be factored into the final 
distribution of produce. This is because while members all contribute an equal share of labour, 
9 US$1 = INR 71 or NPR 114
10 The group has raised additional funds in Koiladi (Nepal) by the renting out the pumpset to neighbouring farmers 
at below the market rate, although this only takes place occasionally. Renting out the pumpset appears to be a 
sensible move by the farmers and adds to their income, since their land is insufficient to make full use of the capital 
investment. The returns are shared equally by the farmers.
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they bring in different amounts of land, varying from 0.2 to 0.5 ha, with nine members 
contributing no land (either because they have none, or because their land is not adjacent to that 
of other members). While there is rather little wealth disparity between group members—86% of  
the members contribute less than 0.5 ha–—it is important for the farmers to be remunerated 
fairly according to the land they contribute. Therefore, for each plot provided by a member, a 
rent is calculated equivalent to what the owner would have received if he/she had rented it out to 
other tenants in the village. This rent is taken into account in calculating harvest shares or the 
cash profits of each group member. In some cases, farmers contribute all of their land to the 
groups, while in other cases farmers keep some land for home use in order to grow dry season 
crops (mainly vegetables) for household consumption, and give the remainder to the collective, 
pooling plots which are adjacent to those of other group members to ensure contiguity.
Models 1 and 2 share all profits and/or output after harvest. Paddy, wheat and other 
staples are shared among members but the better quality vegetables are generally sold to generate 
cash for the group fund, for the next season’s investment. Unsold vegetables are distributed to 
the group members for home consumption. For Models 3 and 4, each farmer keeps the harvest of 
his/her plot, with some cooperation in marketing.
6. THE BENEFITS SO FAR
As of 2018, namely within three years of collective functioning, several benefits were being 
reaped by the collectives, with interesting variations across the models. These included 
challenging feudal relations, bargaining with landlords to reduce rent, land consolidation, labour 
saving, and increase in cropping intensity, crop diversity and crop yields.
Challenging feudal relations 
Group solidarity can potentially translate into greater bargaining power for landless tenants and 
marginal farmers vis-a-vis landlords. The local political power of landlords has decreased 
somewhat in the Eastern Gangetic Plains with the growth of absentee landlordism, greater 
political awareness among tenants, and a decline in interlinked contracts (such as the interlinking 
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of tenancy, credit and labour contracts which tied down the tenant in a semi-feudal exploitative 
relationship).11 At the same time, these changes have not eliminated landlord influence, and even 
now power relations are quite unequal (Sugden, 2017). 
Against this backdrop, it is a notable gain that collective leases pursued under Model 1 
and 3 have enabled group members to challenge old power relationships. For instance, in Koiladi 
village of Saptari (Nepal), past relations between the Rajput landlords and mostly Adivasi 
tenants were marked by severe inequalities. Landlords who now lease land to groups would 
make informal exploitative demands of their sharecroppers. Oral contracts with individual 
farmers were the norm and the landlords exerted their traditional authority to take advantage of 
this informality and demand services from tenants beyond the rent, in terms of helping with 
domestic chores and livestock care. 
One of the Koiladi landlords complained that ever since the farmers took on a collective 
lease, they were unwilling to take on such unpaid obligations. The written contract with the 
collective clearly stipulates that the farmers will pay a fixed cash rent. Furthermore, the process 
of working as a group had given farmers the confidence to refuse to work for the landlord 
beyond the terms of the contract. A breakdown of traditional obligations was apparent in one 
landlord’s complaint that while the farmers work his land they rarely visit his house except to 
pay the rent. He even tried to get the farmers’ group to revert to a sharecropping arrangement by 
which it was reportedly easier to extract additional services. When the farmers’ group refused, 
the landlord terminated the contract. While this event resulted in several group members losing 
interest and leaving the collective, three members remained keen to continue. They invited new 
members and moved their irrigation equipment to another plot owned by a different landowner. 
They also collectively applied for a free tubewell provided by the irrigation department. 
We found similar instances of landlords expecting informal ‘contributions’ in another site 
in Saptari, Nepal. Here the landlord’s family would help themselves to vegetables from the 
11 There is a substantial literature on interlinked markets in India from the 1970s and 1980s, but for an overview see 
especially Bell (1988).
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groups’ field. This was challenged by the collective on repeated occasions, and during a recent 
visit by the landlord the group demanded payment for the vegetables, which was duly given.
Moreover, in a context where rents are usually non-negotiable, there were several 
reported instances of farmers’ collectives being able to extract concessions from landlords, by 
building on their group strength and increased confidence. In Madhubani (Bihar), a Dalit group 
pursuing Model 1 on a 1.2 ha plot was actually approached by the landlord to take on more land, 
since the group had proved to be a reliable and productive tenant. In the past, landlords would be 
unwilling to rent land at all to the Dalit community. The group members felt their bargaining 
power could be enhanced further, if they negotiated jointly with another group (a smaller youth-
led collective) which was als  renting land from the same individual. They therefore arranged a 
lease for 4.45 ha for both groups (1.6 ha for the youth group), and bargained down the rent from 
INR 12,000 per bigha (0.36 ha) to INR 10,000 – which is unusual since, as noted, rents here are 
rarely open to negotiation. Similarly, a collective in Saptari (Nepal) which had diversified into 
fishery production brought down the annual rent of their pond from that originally proposed by 
the landowner.
In part, landlords are willing to cooperate with tenants since they expect to benefit from 
increased productivity due to group formation and Project-supported irrigation. The shift towards 
fixed rent tenancies has benefited tenants, but for landlords too it has provided a guaranteed 
income. Some landlords have also supported the collectives for non-economic benefits, such as 
an opportunity to increase their social standing by displaying benevolence to marginalized 
farmers. This appeared particularly the case among landlords who had moved to urban areas, or 
who drew a significant share of their income from salaried work. 
There are of course limits to the collective bargaining power of former tenants. 
Sometimes prior histories of conflicts continue to play out, as happened in Koiladi village of 
Saptari (Nepal) which has a long history of landlord-tenant conflict, deeply imbued with caste 
inequalities. A group from the Koiladi Dalit community sought to negotiate a land lease, but 
negotiations fell through, given a long-standing dispute over a village pond between Rajput 
landlords and the Dalit community. In the same village, the landowners also attempted to 
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increase the rent of one of the other groups after the installation of irrigation equipment. This 
demand was only withdrawn after intervention by the Project team. 
Apart from increasing their bargaining power with landlords, the farmers as a group have 
been able to claim government entitlements and support which they could not earlier. In Saptari 
(Nepal), subsidies for seeds and fertilizer are offered to cooperatives with a minimum of 20 
members. Three farmer groups therefore merged to access these. Collectives can also become 
tool for spreading knowledge and political awareness from farmer to farmer. Sometimes this can 
spread beyond the group confines through the pre-existing extended networks of each member. 
For example, in Uttar Chakoakheti, a predominantly tribal village of North Bengal, the group 
members encouraged other villagers to apply for Scheduled Tribe status, as well as apply 
collectively for government installed tubewells, and even seek to obtain land ownership 
certificates which they had not held previously.
A contiguous plot
All four models benefit from more efficient land preparation and irrigation, due to their 
cultivation of a contiguous plot. As noted earlier (see Table 7), prior to Project intervention, the 
farmers in the study regions commonly operated 3 to 4 plots usually on minute and scattered 
fields. After forming farmers’ collectives, each group cultivates one contiguous plot of a much 
larger size. The average plots of 0.56 ha in Saptari (Nepal), 1.84 ha in Madhubani (Bihar), and 
1.34 ha in North Bengal, are broadly equivalent to the plot sizes operated by larger more 
mechanized farmers. 
Farmers recognise the benefits of consolidating their land in a large contiguous plot. For 
instance, they report that land preparation has become easier. It was now more economical, 
feasible, and time-saving to use tractors. Similarly, irrigation is more efficient, since moving a 
heavy pumpset between distant plots adds to time and labour, and for electric pumps it is not 
even possible to do so if there is no power source nearby. Contiguity thus brings benefits to all 
four models. 
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However, the models differ in the extent of benefits they reap. In the groundwater 
economy of the Eastern Gangetic Plains, a widespread problem is that farmers have to compete 
for rented pumpsets during times of peak demand, such as during paddy transplanting (Sugden et 
al., 2014). This is a challenge not only for individual farmers who depend on pump rental, but 
also for those sharing a pump under Models 3 and 4. However, even these farmers have 
benefited from greater efficiency, as the pump does not need to be transported across the village. 
When their turn comes, group members simply move the delivery pipe to their own field. Models 
1 and 2, however, do not need to wait their turn for the pumpset or compete for water. Water can 
be applied to different sub-plots in the most efficient order and according to the needs of the 
crops.12 
Labour management and time saving
Models 1 and 2 also have the advantag  of saving on labour time. This is a key benefit especially 
for women who (as noted) bear a heavy work burden with male outmigration. Paddy 
transplanting and harvesting, in particular, require high labour inputs, concentrated within a short 
span of time. Delays in transplanting after early rains can dry out seedlings. Farmers lacking 
sufficient family labour must hire workers in peak seasons, which is difficult since out-migration 
has aggravated shortages of both family and non-family labour. Labour pooling helps address 
this problem. 
In Saptari, as a farmer said, ‘It took me 3 days to complete one field task. With the group 
it takes just half a day or a day’. Traditionally, labour exchange among households was 
common. Even now in both Madhubani (Bihar) and North Bengal, households (usually 
neighbours) sometimes exchange labour for paddy transplanting. In North Bengal this is an 
important cultural practice known as hauli,13 and a day of work generally ends with a feast 
hosted by the household whose plot was worked on that day. In fact, labour exchange institutions 
have been widespread across Asia’s rice farming systems.14 While these institutions have been 
12 Even in Vietnam, the challenges of synchronising irrigation was one of the drivers which encouraged the 
collective exchange of labour in the Mekong delta, in both the socialist and pre-socialist period (Tuan et al., 2014).
13 See Shrestha (2010) for insights into the hauli system amongst Rajbanshis in eastern Nepal.
14 See Messerschmidt (1981) for Nepal, Shah (2013) for India, and Tuan et al. (2014) for Vietnam.
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eroding in recent years due to out-migration and associated labour scarcities, the farmers’ will to 
work together remains, and the collectives have helped maintain this system to some extent. 
Furthermore, Models 1 and 2 extend the benefits of indigenous labour exchange systems beyond 
peak labour demands to the entire agricultural cycle. 
Several group members noted that in the past, each farmer was responsible for buying 
fertilizers or selling vegetables. Now these tasks can be delegated to one member, giving the 
remaining members time for other activities. Each group member also brings new skills and 
experience to the collective knowledge pool; and the time saving that group farming allows has 
fostered a sense of solidarity, or ‘bhaichara’ (brotherhood), as they term it.  Even in Models 3 
and 4 which involve owned plots, some labour exchange continues during busy times, 
particularly in North Bengal. 
Apart from labour saving, cooperation brings savings on other input costs. Fertilizer costs 
less when purchased in bulk, as under Models 1 and 2. They only pay for transportation once, 
and also save time in loading the produce. Models 3 and 4 mostly purchase their own fertilizer, 
although here too there is potential for cost reduction through joint input procurement.  
Impact on cropping intensity, diversity and crop yields
The technical intervention of irrigation provisioning and the institutional innovation of group 
farming have jointly helped increase cropping intensity, the diversity of crops grown, and crop 
yields. Some may argue that irrigation in itself can bring substantial gain on these counts. But in 
our Project, it is not possible to separate the effect of group formation from the irrigation 
interventions, since in many cases irrigation would not have been feasible without group 
formation. As noted above, group formation enabled land consolidation into larger continuous 
plots which made irrigation both economical and practically feasible. Group formation also 
helped the farmers use other machines such as tractors. One of the beneficial effects of 
increasing the size of farms in India is to reap scale economies in machine use (Foster and 
Rosensweig 2011).  Hence we can attribute the gains described below to the joint effect of 
irrigation and group formation.
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We found, to begin with, that the groups had increased cropping intensity on the land 
they cultivated. This includes bringing fallow land under cultivation (Table 8). The most 
substantial change took place in the pre-monsoon period. In 2014-15, prior to the formation of 
the collectives, 97% of land in Saptari and 96% in Madhubani was fallow in the pre-monsoon 
(pre-kharif) period. In 2017-18 this had fallen to 44% in both sites, mostly due to the cultivation 
of pre-monsoon vegetables and pluses.
<Insert Table 8  near here>
The cropping pattern has also become more diverse. In Saptari and Madhubani, for 
example, prior to the intervention in 2014-15, the dominant crops were monsoon (kharif) paddy, 
followed by winter (rabi) wheat, pulses and mustard on some of the land. Now paddy is 
supplemented by monsoon vegetables on higher land, and grains, pulses and vegetables in 
winter.  In North Bengal, the farmers have shifted from monsoon paddy and limited potato, to 
paddy followed by winter potatoes, vegetables, wheat, maize and jute
In addition, we note clear yield increases in key crops in each region, if we compare the 
2014-15 pre-intervention period and each subsequent year of intervention until 2018-19 (Tables 
9-11).15 The pre-intervention figures were obtained through the baseline survey undertaken prior 
to Project implementation. Each farmer who later constituted a given group was asked his/her 
average crop yield for specific crops in 2014/15, and the average for that group in the pre-
intervention was thus calculated. The post-intervention information on crops grown and yields 
obtained was collected seasonally by the local NGO from the participating farmers, through 
focus group discussions with each group separately at the end of each season. Since the NGO 
teams were also present at the time of crop harvesting and sale, they were able to broadly assess 
the veracity of the figures given by the collectives. Although this method does not provide the 
kind of accurate estimates that would be obtained through meticulous weekly data collection as 
undertaken by Agarwal (2018), it does give a broad idea of the yield effects.  
15 This data was gathered from the previous cultivators of the land in the baseline census of the village. Yields from 
some groups (mostly those formed after the inception of the project) is not available.
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We cannot draw conclusions about which model works best in terms of productivity, but 
in all the collectives the figures point to significant improvements in yields. For example, in 
Koiladi 1 (Saptari, Nepal), paddy yields were 3550 kg/ha in 2014-15 prior to group formation, 
and had risen to 4730 khg/ha in 2017-18 while pursuing Model 3. Similarly we note an increase 
in wheat yields. In addition, both the Kanapatti groups have gained considerably in output 
produced, since prior to the intervention the land was fallow and so producing nothing.
Again, in Bhagwatipur (Bihar), all the groups show growing improvements over time in 
paddy yields from 2014-15 to 2018-19, and wheat yields between the pre-intervention figures 
and 2017-18 (Table 10). In some cases there have been quite substantial yield increases, such as 
the almost doubling of wheat yields in Group 4 (Model 3) from 2200 kg/ha to 4150 kg/ha 
between 2014-15 and  2017-18. 
In North Bengal, again, paddy yields have risen in all cases, and quite substantially 
among the Dholaguri groups (Table 11). Although all groups except Dholaguri group 4 farmed 
their own plots during the monsoon, they cooperated in other ways (as discussed below). For 
potatoes where labour was pooled following Model 2 in the Dholaguri Groups 1 and 3, yields 
were higher in 2018/19 by 30% and 48% respectively, relative to the pre-project winter of 
2014/15.
 <Insert tables 9 to 11 near here>
These improvements in cropping intensity and farm productivity, as noted, are likely to 
reflect the combined effect of using the irrigation equipment supplied by the Project, and group 
formation. The latter not only made efficient irrigation feasible, it also brought other benefits 
such as improved land preparation and input use, greater labour availability which allowed 
timely completion of operations, and so on. In other words, promoting institutional innovation 
with the technology was key to the benefits obtained. Without group formation, the effect of the 
technology would have been limited 
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7. THE CHALLENGES
Along with the benefits, however, group formation has also brought challenges.
Timekeeping and group management
The main challenge under Models 1 and 2 arose in labour sharing, and the fact that not all group 
members were contributing labour as and when required. A women’s group in Bhagwatipur 
village, Bihar states: 
Often there are allegations such as ‘I did more work than you’; ‘I did all the work yesterday 
and you did not, so you should do it today’; ‘I harvested most of the paddy crops compared to 
others in the group’.
A long running critique of collective production from the socialist and post-colonial 
experiences has been that it is likely to lead to labour sharing problems.16 However, these 
assumptions have been called to question both by developments in collective action theory which 
now recognizes that trust and community relations can help overcome such problems, and by 
practical experience. On the latter, for instance, Li notes that in the smaller collectives of the late 
Maoist era in China, peer-pressure and solidarity helped check work shirking. Similarly, in our 
study, we cannot assume that farmers were consciously ‘shirking’. Most farmers recognised that 
group farming saved them time which they could spend on other activities, and that it was in 
their interest to contribute the expected labour hours, while also acknowledging that peer 
pressure encouraged members to contribute fairly. However, as we found in our farmer 
interviews and focus group discussions, farmers often struggled to coordinate their busy work 
schedule in order to find common time during which all of them were available. They frequently 
remarked that all of them needed to be present together, and if some members were busy then 
conflicts could arise.
16 See Dang (2009) for Vietnam, and Scott (1998) for Tanzania.
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There are several processes at play here. The group farms are not large enough in area for 
members to meet their entire subsistence needs. Some farmers reported a tendency for members 
to prioritise their own farms outside the collective. This was often for pragmatic reasons linked 
to the need to coordinate certain activities on personally farmed plots, such as planting when 
water was available. For example, one respondent noted that if he had called labourers to work 
on his private plot for paddy transplantation when irrigation was available, he needed to finish 
that task before coming to work on the collective. However, if members failed to turn up on time 
it delayed key group activities, with a possible adverse effect on productivity. One female group 
member in a mixed group in Koiladi reflected on these challenges:
Many times we could not irrigate the vegetables [on the collective farm], as none of us had 
time. As a result the crops d ied up. The Brinjals (eggplant) got damaged due to delayed 
irrigation. We don’t have men to support us in our agricultural work. Sometimes my father-
in-law helps.
This illustrates the challenges that women, in particular, face. Due to male out-migration, 
they manage their own fields and livestock (outside the collective) as well as domestic tasks such 
as cooking and collecting dung for fuel. Some women also supplement their income with other 
work. In Koiladi of Saptari, for example, they sell snacks in the periodic market. In North 
Bengal, many men and women were engaged in off-farm labour – including under the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS),17 and some members of the 
tribal community in Uttar Chakoakheti migrate seasonally to Bhutan, leaving their family 
members to take on their group responsibilities. This causes a conflict between working on one’s 
home fields and working on the collective. 
Some groups in North Bengal were able to weather these challenges, but others reduced 
their degree of cooperation. For instance, in Koiladi and Bhagwatipur villages in Bihar, four 
groups shifted from labour pooling under Model 1 to individual plot cultivation under Model 3 
after several seasons. In Bhagwatipur, members devised a midway solution, namely subdividing 
17 The MNREGS provides 100 days of work per year per household to rural communities, mostly on government 
infrastructure programmes.
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into smaller teams which work on the collectively leased land on assigned days of the week on a 
rotation basis. However, this led to mistrust between the teams over which team had put in more 
work. For vegetables, there was mistrust over how much had been sold on each day, since 
vegetables are generally harvested continuously over several weeks rather than as a one off 
event. Eventually, like the two Koiladi groups, the Bhagwatipur ones also reverted to partial 
cooperation: they now cooperate for land leasing, irrigation and marketing, and some also for 
land preparation and paddy transplanting, but take individual responsibility for all other 
agricultural tasks and the purchase of inputs. It is possible that over time, frequent interaction 
could help build greater trust among the members, which along with observing the benefits of 
cooperation they could move to higher levels of cooperation. 
Gendered division of labor and inequities
One of the key aims of the Project is to provide women with an avenue for empowerment.  
While the results are positive, particularly for women-headed households, traditional gender 
roles pose challenges, particularly in all-women groups.18 Women have to depend on male 
household members or outside labourers for what are considered ‘male tasks’, such as land 
preparation, transporting and starting the pump, laying pipes for irrigation, and digging furrows. 
Gender norms are deeply engrained, as one women stated in Koiladi village.
How can girls operate pumps? I get scared to use the pump. What if I am electrocuted? Look 
at my daughter, she does not know anything.
A male farmer in Koiladi also noted his ‘concerns’ regarding female work roles, 
exemplifying the prevailing attitude that certain ‘technical’ tasks, such as irrigation, fall outside 
the female domain.
How will women irrigate with the pump? They know how to switch the pump on and off, but 
what if the motor fails to draw water after switching the system on. In that case they may 
18 See also the insights on gender inequalities and dynamics of these farmers’collectives in Leder et al. (2019).
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damage the motor. I know that if the motor does not function, I check the fan with a stick and 
switch on the machine again. Women can irrigate once the pump is functioning, but if there 
are problems in the motor, they cannot fix it. For example, a motor should be put 3 inches 
below the boring, otherwise it will not draw water properly. 
In some respects, the ability to draw upon men for tasks such as irrigation is advantageous 
for women, as it encourages voluntary support from household men and gives them a sense of 
joint ownership in what are women-run enterprises. However, not all groups can mobilise male 
family members. Women-headed households, in particular, are dependent on male wage 
labourers from outside, which adds to their production cost. 
However, in Bhagwatipur village (Madhubani, Bihar) and Kanakpatti village (Saptari, 
Nepal), and amongst the all-female groups in North Bengal, women have started operating 
pumps on their own, due in part to the introduction of more user friendly solar and electric 
pumps. Women have also been taking over other tasks which were formerly in the male domain, 
such as negotiating with tractor operators or ploughmen for land preparation. This provides a 
way forward. As one women stated in Kanakpatti:
When we were girls, we were not allowed to ride bicycles or go to school. I have learned… to 
cycle and to write. Similarly, I have learnt to operate pumps and spray machines. 
Some of the women in nearby areas have gained experience by operating electric pumps in their 
homes, and now know how to prime pumps as well. 
Another challenge is associated with mixed groups pursuing Models 1 and 2. While all 
members receive an equal share of the produce, the rigid gender division of labour places greater 
burdens on women for tasks seen as ‘women’s work’, such as weeding and transplanting. These 
tasks are often more labour intensive, compared with what are considered ‘male’ activities within 
the group, such as negotiating for leasing land or a tractor, land preparation and repairing bunds, 
or purchasing seeds. In North Bengal it was noted that men would often come to work on the 
agreed day, but would spend less time on the land, as they considered their tasks ‘higher value’ – 
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reflecting the prevailing agricultural labour market where ‘male’ tasks such as land preparation 
receive higher wages. As noted above, coordinating busy schedules was seen as a bigger 
constraint in labour management than active work ‘shirking’. But when such complaints did 
arise, they usually tended to be about men in mixed groups not contributing their fair share of 
labour time. Male members also sometimes call on their female relatives to help in transplanting 
and harvesting. As these workers are not core members of the group, they get no direct benefits 
from the group activity in terms of payment.  
It could be argued that both male and female family members who substitute for a group 
member are providing unpaid services, but women are already heavily burdened with work, and 
wives and daughters-in-laws are often less in a position to refuse to help when asked by male 
family members, than vice-versa. 
8. COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF MODELS
Several mediating factors are seen to affect successful labour pooling under all four models.
Crop type
The first is the crop grown. For foodgrains such as paddy and wheat, farmers in Madhubani and 
Saptari felt that labour management is relatively straightforward, as everyone is required for 
some days of intensive work during transplanting, weeding and harvesting. This contrasted with 
vegetable production which required a less intense but more frequent mobilisation of labour 
every few days for weeding, irrigating, pesticide application, and harvesting – with the latter 
often being spread over several weeks as the vegetables mature. This was more difficult to 
coordinate. As a result, in Kanakpatti, two groups changed their level of cooperation and decided 
to cultivate vegetable fields individually as in Model 3, while cultivating paddy and wheat 
collectively, as in Model 1. As a woman farmer in Koiladi village noted: 
Vegetable farming needs a lot of work. Potato, cauliflower, and cabbage need weeding. We 
also have to check whether the plants require water. In contrast, winter wheat requires less 
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labour. We have to plough, apply fertilizer, and irrigate twice — once some 25 days after 
sowing and a second time later. 
Not all groups share this view, however. In North Bengal, all but one of the groups did 
vegetable cultivation collectively under Model 2 and reverted to individual cultivation for the 
monsoon season (as in Model 4). Underlying this was a cultural preference in the community for 
each family to be responsible for its own paddy crop. Historically, farmers in these communities 
have always cultivated their own land during the paddy season to ensure food security, and rarely 
lease out land at this time of year. Nevertheless, even with their own plots, transplanting remains 
a cooperative process, with most farmers exchanging labour. 
Group composition
A second factor affecting labour pooling is the social composition and history of the group and 
especially gender and age dynamics. While most groups belong to the same ethnic community or 
caste, the women-only groups in Nepal and Bihar showed a greater ability to work together, 
relative to the mixed-gender groups. Three out of four groups which abandoned labour pooling 
under Model 1 (Koiladi 1 and 2 and Bhagwatipur 1) were mixed groups, and these were the first 
to experience conflict over labour contributions. On the whole, women-only groups such as in 
Mahuyahi 2 (in Bihar) and Kankapatti 1 (in Nepal) were successful in working together with 
relatively little conflict, and demonstrated strong bonds of solidarity. It is notable that Mahuyahi 
2 had emerged organically on the initiative of the farmers themselves, with minimal support 
from the Project partners. 
Regional differences 
Third, regions differ in their relative success with labour pooling. North Bengal is more 
successful compared to Madhubani (Bihar) and Saptari (Nepal), despite the fact that all but two 
of the North Bengal collectives are predominantly male or all-male. Although in Madhubani and 
Saptari too, three groups have successfully pooled labour, this is not the case with the other 
groups here. For instance, four groups in this region began by pooling labour under Model 1 at 
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the start of the Project, and one group experimented with Model 2, but subsequently all four 
reverted to Models 3 and 4 – the primary constraint being labour management and coordinating 
the members’ schedules to come to the field at the same time for given operations.
In contrast, all the North Bengal groups are pooling labour under Model 2, for all crops 
except paddy, and although labour management constraints were mentioned, this was not a large 
enough problem for the group to abandon labour pooling. In these sites, peer pressure and strong 
cohesion encourage farmers to come on time or make up for lost time later, as also noted by 
Agarwal (2019b) in her regions. Moreover, there was mutual understanding that although 
individual family circumstances can occasionally make it difficult for some members to come on 
time on a given day, these differences would be made up within the whole agricultural cycle. 
Compensation from members was only sought for repeated absences.
There appear to be several reasons why labour management issues could be resolved in 
North Bengal but not in Nepal and Bihar (see also Table 12). First, there is a long history of 
successful collective action in the North Bengal villages. For example, in the past, marketing 
cooperatives and SHGs had been particularly active in Dholaguri. Some members had even tried 
labour pooling on a smaller scale to cultivate turmeric as part of an earlier government-supported 
project. There is also an active farmers club in the community which has its own plot of land 
used for collective endeavors. Uttar Chakoakheti too has a history of collective investment. For 
example, one neighborhood recently invested jointly in furniture and utensils for social events. 
That past experience in successful collective action helps subsequent attempts is also noted in 
other contexts (Seabright, 1997, Agarwal, 2010a), as do strong social bonds and solidarity 
between members (Li, 2018).
<Insert table 12 near here>
Secondly, it is possible that in North Bengal, successful cooperation is associated to some 
extent with the Operation Barga land reforms under which West Bengal successfully mobilized 
peasants for their collective rights and recorded the land rights of tenants—something not seen 
on this scale in Bihar or Nepal.  West Bengal also encouraged some of the former landless 
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beneficiaries of Operation Barga to pool their land and cultivate together in small groups 
(Patnaik, 2001). However, more research is needed to understand the role of peasant political 
history and its effect on farmers working together. 
Thirdly, the North Bengal community has fewer caste divisions relative to the Bihar and 
Nepal sites, enabling the building of stronger community trust and cohesion (Dholaguri is almost 
entirely Rajbanshi, and Uttar Chakoakheti is predominantly tribal). In addition, there are 
indigenous institutions within these communities which foster cooperation, such as the earlier 
mentioned labour exchange system, hauli, reinforced by jointly celebrated cultural and religious 
festivals (Leder et al. 2019). While such practices are also observed to a degree in Madhubani 
(Bihar), they were particularly widespread in North Bengal, and have both a cultural and an 
economic function. In some contexts, through this system, groups have even brought in non-
group members to support the collective during busy times.
Fourthly, the North Bengal farmers have fewer plots outside the collective. Hence, for 
many farmers, the land contributed to the collective is the family’s primary agricultural land. 
There is thus less conflict between farming one’s own land and working on the collective farm. 
In Bihar, the farmers cited this as one reason why the women’s group in Mahuyahi was more 
successful in labour pooling than the women’s group in Bhagwatipur. In the former, most 
farmers had only very small plots of less than 0.1–0.2 ha outside the collective, while in the 
latter, members had relatively larger areas of land up to 0.5 ha, which they were leasing in 
separately for family use. 
9. LESSONS LEARNT AND FURTHER RESEARCH
What then are the lessons offered thus far by these experiments in group farming? A key lesson 
is the need to experiment with and allow multiple models to emerge, with varying levels of 
cooperation. These variations may emerge for several reasons, such as differences in the extent 
of prior trust among farmers in a region, historic social inequalities, prior experience of 
cooperating, the nature of land lease markets, the crops grown, and so on. Over time as trust 
develops or cropping patterns change, the models may also change.  In prior histories of group 
farming, model designs were typically decided by those promoting the collectives. 
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Second, whichever model emerges, there are clear gains from cooperation. The 
collectives have helped farmers locked into unequal landlord–tenant relations by increasing their 
bargaining power with landlords, enabling them to obtain better rental terms and to undermine 
the landlord’s feudal expectations that the tenant would provide additional unpaid labour. The 
collectives have also helped farmers increase their cultivated area and create larger contiguous 
plots, thus reaping economies of scale in machine use and labour sharing, and reducing the costs 
of input purchase. All these gains demonstrate that farmers’ collectives offer a significant 
opportunity for marginal/small and pure tenant farmers to overcome agrarian stress.
At the same time, the models have not yet gone far enough to create widespread class 
consciousness and solidarity among marginal and tenant farmers. The number of farmers 
engaged in group farming is still too small to help undermine inequitable agrarian relations 
across the region. Nevertheless, even the incremental empowerment of tenants’ is important, and 
with the expansion of this model in the long term, group solidarity could potentially develop to 
help tenants claim their legal rights to land, and support movements for tenancy reform – 
particularly if groups begin to take on a much larger share of rented land in the community. How 
the interests of landlords and other stakeholders (e.g. input dealers) would be affected by a more 
widespread adoption of the collective model opens up questions for further research.
Third, the collectives reap most benefits when they pool labour, as in Models 1 and 2, 
since it reduces their peak labour shortages and helps irrigate their fields more efficiently, 
provided they can overcome work coordination problems. But the models work much better in 
some locales, such as the North Bengal with its largely tribal population and prior agrarian 
reform history, than in the caste heartland of the East Gangetic Plains in Nepal and Bihar. 
Labour coordination issues are resolved informally in North Bengal, while elsewhere 
more formal methods may be needed, such as keeping regular records of time inputs, and 
reviewing aggregate labour and financial contributions at the end of each crop season. Overall 
compensation (such as a share of the harvest) could then be linked more accurately with time 
worked. Some groups in North Bengal have a constitution, and have started time sheets which 
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also include a division of responsibilities. If a member cannot come on a particular day, a wage 
labourer or a family member can be sent to substitute, as also observed by Agarwal (2019b) in 
Kerala and Telangana.  However, the time sheets are not used to calculate shares of the harvest; 
they are used to ensure that absentees can provide labour later or substitute their family members 
to take their place. We need further experimentation to see how the labour sharing issue can be 
resolved.
At the individual farmer level, a conflict can also arise between the time spent working 
on the group farm versus working on one’s own farm. A possible solution would lie in increasing 
the size of the group farm, by having people pool more of their land with the group, so that it can 
cover the members’ subsistence needs to a greater extent. We have seen that in sites where 
farmers have fewer plots outside the collective there is less conflict over labour time. 
A fourth lesson lies in the potential connection between crops grown and cooperation. 
The experience thus far suggests that due to cultural practices and the intensity of labour use, 
certain crops are more amenable to collective farming in particular regions than others. Hence, 
we saw that monsoon paddy was done individually in North Bengal by all but one group due to 
cultural preferences, while vegetables were farmed collectively. 
Overall, this indicates the need for sensitivity to local differences in cultural, ethnic and 
gender norms as well as the technical needs of crops in choosing group models, allowing 
combinations of models to emerge. While ongoing awareness-raising among farmers on the 
benefits of fully integrated cooperation, including labour sharing, is important, it is essential that 
farmers are comfortable with these changes and adapt the model to their needs at their own pace.
Building sustainable collectives
Beyond individual models, the question of their sustaining over time is also key, as is the 
model’s replicability. The provision of irrigation and other equipment through the Project cannot 
be sustained in the long run. However this, in itself, need not reduce the model’s replicability or 
its long run sustainability. Most previous initiatives at successful collective formations in South 
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Asia have focused primarily on the social interventions of group formation without providing 
technical hardware, since farmers can adapt their cropping patterns to include less water 
intensive crops. A variety of this equipment is also available through government schemes at 
heavily subsidized rates, and forming groups can facilitate access to these schemes both due to 
collective strength of the collectives, and because many schemes offer resources to groups rather 
than to individual farmers. 
Even without equipment contributions, however, other types of long-term external 
support is likely to be needed to assist existing groups in accessing state subsidies and obtaining 
technical and managerial inputs. Support will also be needed to help new entrants who want to 
form groups. These functions can be served by creating an ‘institutional spine’ to connect the 
groups and help in the replication of our models,19  as discussed further below. At present, the 
groups depend on the local NGO and government partners in each site for technical support and 
guidance in financial management, although some groups are more independent than others. 
Also, while group farming has improved the farmers’ bargaining power with landlords and other 
stakeholders, not uncommonly the Project partners have also played a mediating role, 
particularly in disputes over rent or contributions to the group fund. An alternative institutional 
mechanism is needed to replace these third party stakeholders. This, we believe, will help to 
make the joint farming approach more sustainable. 
Potential models for an institutional spine could be (a) a federation of farmers’ collectives 
which links them horizontally and vertically, as among SHGs, or (b) forming community led 
societies of collectives which are independently registered at the village council level, as done in 
Kerala. Agarwal (2019c) discusses both types of support structures in the collectives she studied, 
the federation of women’s collectives in Telangana and community development societies in 
Kerala.  Importantly, the Kerala collectives had more leverage with government agencies, in 
terms of direct technical training, access to subsidies, and so on. In our study area, in addition to 
technical support such institutions could participate in dispute resolution, upholding rules and 
best practices, and putting farmers in touch with the relevant government authorities. Indeed, 
19 This was suggested by Agarwal during her field visit, based on her analysis of the Kerala and Telangana group 
farming experience.
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farmers’ collectives need to become a core component of the government’s agricultural 
development strategy and commitment, while also being able to exercise autonomy. A triangular 
approach could well provide the answer, with farmers’ collectives, civil society, and government 
agencies constituting the three institutional pillars.
The importance and advantages of an institutional body is apparent even now in our study 
area. Here a farmer’s club in Dholaguri, North Bengal, which predates the Project, has provided 
a loose institutional base for the collectives in that village. It has already helped to strengthen 
bonds of trust between the farmers, and provided technical support to the collectives. 
Gender and other inequalities
Improving gender equality within the collectives is another challenge. A focus on single gender 
groups is worth considering, but women themselves had mixed views on this. Some feel that 
women-only groups are more cohesive, and help reduce conflict over labour contributions, while 
others feel that mixed groups are needed to reduce the need to hire male labourers for 
traditionally male tasks, thus saving costs. When promoting mixed groups, however, gender 
inequities will need to be addressed. These can take several forms.  For instance, women’s 
contributions in mixed-gender groups tend to be greater than men’s, given the gender division of 
labour whereby the more labour intensive tasks such has transplanting rice and weeding are 
considered ‘women’s tasks’ while the more mechanized ones, such as land preparation and 
irrigation, are seen as falling in the men’s domain. Also male members often draw upon their 
wives as ‘substitutes’ when they are absent, but retain the output themselves. A way around the 
latter problem would be to keep a record of labour inputs by family members providing 
substitute labour and compensating them for the work done at the end of the year, as noted 
earlier. 
In the long term, of course, organizations supporting the formation of collectives would 
need to prioritize training women in technical tasks which fall within the male domain and 
encouraging men to take on so-called female tasks. In fact, paddy transplanting is sometimes 
found to be done by hired male labour in south India, along with hired female labour (Agarwal, 
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1985). This will help to undermine rigidities in the division of labour within mixed groups and 
also reduce the dependence of all-women groups on men for particular tasks. We have already 
seen this shift in some of the women’s collectives in Bihar and Nepal where, after being trained, 
women could operate the irrigation pumpsets themselves. Broader sensitization amongst groups 
around gender inequalities in agriculture should also be an important part of future interventions. 
Indeed, the Project has already piloted a participatory gender training with all the groups as part 
of this process (Leder, 2016).
Beyond gender, most groups are caste homogenous, and do not have large disparities of 
wealth between members, particularly for Models 1 and 3 which are constituted mostly of 
tenants. Of course differences can exist within the groups in the levels of education and the 
social networks different members may command, and this can result in unequal power over 
decision making. At the same time, the presence of members with greater social capital can also 
work to the group’s advantage when it comes to accessing state services or bargaining with 
external stakeholders. The most significant intra-group differences are in Model 2 in West 
Bengal, where farmers have contributed different amounts of land, with a small number 
providing none. While these differences are relatively low since the farmers are mostly poor in 
the first instance (most own under 0.5 ha), more research is needed to assess if these intra-group 
economic disparities affect cooperation.
Another relevant question is whether Model 2 based on the pooling of owned land is 
likely to perform better than Model 1 based on the pooling of leased land. On the one hand, 
Model 2 has an advantage in that all the returns from cultivation will accrue to the group 
members, while the returns in Model 1 will be net of the rent paid to the landlords. At the same 
time, Model 2 may prove less stable in terms of cooperation since all the members have an exit 
option, while the farmers forming Model 1 are more interdependent and therefore more likely to 
remain together. These are again questions for further research. 
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In Conclusion
To conclude, this paper, based on an Action Research Project to encourage group 
farming, shows that bottom-up, voluntarily-constituted farmers’ collectives offer significant 
opportunities and benefits to marginal farmers and landless tenants, including women. In 
particular, they are able to overcome agrarian stress and create more viable farm units.  The 
paper does not provide a blueprint, but seeks to present lessons from a project in progress, and 
insights on different models of collective. It also brings to light the challenges faced by the 
farmers in group formation, which underlie the evolution of the diverse models.
Importantly, the experience shows that these collectives have the capability of 
challenging long entrenched power relations within feudal settings. Although they are not at 
present numerous enough to change the overall feudal structure of entire villages, they have the 
potential of doing so, since the demonstrated success of a few could lead to the formation of 
many new collectives. It is also possible that, over time, they will begin to engage politically at 
the local level, as found by Agarwal (2019b) among women’s collectives in Kerala and 
Telangana. The internal dynamics of power relations within the collectives are also a challenge, 
especially along gender lines, but since no single model was imposed on them from above, they 
have been able to reconfigure their compositions, as well as adapt their extent of cooperation to 
what works for each 
The experiment also opens up an agenda for further research in an institutional aspect of 
farming which is often overlooked. Much work remains to be done to test, tailor and develop 
multiple models of collective production, suitable to the complex social formation of the Eastern 
Gangetic Plains, and more generally to meet the needs of South Asia’s most vulnerable farmers, 
especially in the context of climate change. The impact on productivity and profits also need 
assessing, based on carefully collected detailed data of group farms in comparison with 
conventional family farms. In addition, some of our observations could be treated as hypotheses 
for further testing, such as how the local history of agrarian relations and land reform might 
impinge on the potential for cooperation and collective action, and the kinds of collectives that 
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may emerge. We hope that the lessons learnt thus far will further these research and action 
agendas. 
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 Table 1: Collective farming pilot sites
 State District villages
NEPAL Satpari Koilada, Kanakpatti
BIHAR (India) Madhubani Bhagwatipur, Mahuyahi
Cooch Behar DholaguriNORTH BENGAL 
(India) Alidurpur Uttar Chakoakheti
Table 2:  Distribution of owned Land among village households:
Satpari Nepal, both villages
Land ownership
categories
No of 
HHs
% HHs % HHs  
renting land
% land 
owned 
landless 386 54.8 40.7 0.00
marginal (<0.5ha) 172 24.4 52.9 12.8
small (0.5-1ha) 68   9.6 27.9 14.2
medium (1-2ha) 52   7.4 7.7 21.1
large (>2ha) 27   3.8 8.3 27.5
Land not owned by 
surveyed farmers *
NA NA
24.4
Total 705 100.0 0.0
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015)
Notes: HH= household 
*Mostly includes land owned by absentee land owners which is cultivated on a rental 
basis
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Table 3:  Distribution of owned Land among village households:
Madhubani district, Bihar, both villages
Land ownership 
categories
No of 
village 
HHs
% HHs by 
category
% HHs in 
given category, 
renting land 
% land 
owned by 
category
landless 455 53.4 41.8 0.00
marginal (<0.5ha) 276 32.4 37.0
22.5
small (0.5-1ha) 87 10.2 17.2
25.7
medium (1-2ha) 18   2.1 16.7 10.6
large (> 2ha) 16   1.9   0.0 36.0
Land not owned 
by surveyed 
farmers*
  NA   NA
5.2
Total 852 100.0 -- 100
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015)
Notes: HH= household.  *Mostly includes land owned by absentee land owners which 
is cultivated on a rental basis
Table 4: Distribution of owned Land among village households:
North Bengal, India, both villages
Land ownership
categories
No of 
village HHs
% HHs by 
category
% HHs in 
given 
category, 
renting 
land 
% land 
owned by 
category
landless 189 37.3 15.9 0.00
marginal (<0.5ha) 177 34.9 17.5 18.6
small (0.5-1ha) 97 19.1 9.3 30.0
medium (1-2ha) 31 6.1 0.0 17.8
large (<2ha) 13 2.6 0.0 16.4
Land not owned by 
surveyed farmers *
NA NA 17.2
Total 507 100.00 100.00
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015)
Notes: HH= household  
*Mostly includes land owned by absentee land owners which is cultivated on a rental 
basis 
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Table 5: Four models of farmers’ collectives 
Collective 
model
Target 
group
Levels of 
cooperation
Land 
arrangement
Labour 
arrangement
Collective 
sharing
Region 
where 
model is 
piloted
Model 1 Landless/ 
tenants
Multipurpose 
comprehensive 
cooperation
Collective 
leasing of one 
contiguous 
area
Pooled labour 
within group
Land, labour, 
inputs, all 
costs and 
produce
Bihar (India)
Madhubani 
district
Nepal 
Saptari 
district 
Model 2 Small owner 
cultivators
Multipurpose 
comprehensive 
cooperation
Consolidation 
of private 
plots under 
one 
contiguous 
area
Pooled labour 
within group
Land, labour, 
inputs, all 
costs and 
produce
North 
Bengal 
Alipurduar 
and Cooch 
Behar 
districts 
Model 3 Landless/
tenants
Multipurpose 
medium 
cooperation
Collective 
leasing of one 
contiguous 
area, but 
maintaining 
individual 
sub-plots 
Household 
labour on 
own land 
Land 
preparation, 
irrigation and 
input 
purchase
Bihar (India)
Madhubani 
district
Nepal 
Saptari 
district
Model 4 Small owner 
cultivators 
Multipurpose 
medium 
cooperation
No leasing. 
Maintenance 
of individual 
sub-plots 
within single 
contiguous 
area
Household 
labour on 
own land. 
Land 
preparation, 
irrigation and 
input 
purchase
Bihar (India)
Madhubani 
district
Source: Authors’ typology
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Table 6: Key characteristics of collectives in each site
Site Village and 
group 
No of 
members
% group 
who are  
women
 Caste or 
ethnic 
group
Type of 
models
(summer 
2018)
Farm 
Size 
(ha)
Type of land 
pooling
Labour and 
produce 
shared 
1 0.29 Collective lease √
Kanakpatti 1 8 100.0 Tribal 3 0.57 Collective lease
1 0.22 Collective lease √
Kanakpatti 2 8 87.5
Tribal and 
Muslim 3 0.74 Collective lease
Kanakpatti 3 7 71.4 Dalit 3 0.81 Collective lease
Koiladi 1 6 33.4 Tribal 1>>>3 0.81 Collective lease
Nepal 
Saptari 
district 
Koiladi 2 6 66.7 Tribal 1>>>3 0.51 Collective lease √
Bhagwatipur 1 8 37.5 Dalit 1 >>>3 1.5 Collective lease √
Bhagwatipur 2 9 12.5 Dalit 4 2.1
Individually 
owned plots
Bhagwatipur 3 7 28.6
Dalit and 
Yadav 4 3.2
Individually 
owned plots
Bhagwatipur 4 5 100.0
Dalit and 
Yadav 1 >>> 3 0.8 Collective lease √
Mahuyahi 1 6 50.0
Muslim and 
Yadav 3 1.0
Consolidation 
of private plots √
Mahuyahi 2 5 100.0 Dalit 1 1.08 Collective lease √
Bihar 
(India)
Madhubani 
district
Mahuyahi 3 
(youth group) 4 0.0 Dalit 1 1.61 Collective lease √
Dholaguri 1 5 0.0 Rajbanshi
2 (4 in 
monsoon)
1.19 Consolidation 
of private plots √
Dholaguri 2 10 40.0 Rajbanshi
2 (4 in 
monsoon)
1.34 Consolidation 
of private plots √
Dholaguri 3 9 44.4 Rajbanshi
2 (4 in 
monsoon)
0.68 Consolidation 
of private plots √
Dholaguri 4 5 100.0 Rajbanshi 2
1.00 Consolidation 
of private plots √
Uttar 
Chakoakheti 1 8 0.0 Tribal
2 (4 in 
monsoon) 2.39
Consolidation 
of private plots √
Uttar 
Chakoakheti 2 7 14.3
Tribal 2 (4 in 
monsoon) 2.20
Consolidation 
of private plots √
Uttar 
Chakoakheti 3 7 100.0
Tribal 2 (4 in 
monsoon) 1.77
Consolidation 
of private plots √
North 
Bengal 
Alipurduar 
and Cooch 
Behar 
districts 
Uttar 
Chakoakheti 4 7 28.6
Tribal 2 (4 in 
monsoon) 0.93
Consolidation 
of private plots √
Source: Seasonal survey conducted by field team.
Note: >>> means move from one type of model to another
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Table 7: Number and size of plots by farmer category before and after intervention
(averages based on village level data)  
NEPAL BIHAR NORTH BENGAL  
Saptari Madhubani Cooch Behar, Alidurpur
Farm 
category
No of 
plots 
Average 
size of 
plots  
Average 
farm 
size
No of 
plots 
Average 
size of 
plots
Average 
farm 
size
No 
of 
plots
Average 
size of 
plots
Average 
farm 
size
 Pre-intervention individual farms
Landless 
tenant
1.78 0.33 0.24 2.27 0.17 0.16 1.41 0.27 0.40
marginal 
owner 
(<0.5ha)
2.58 0.21 0.53 3.07 0.11 0.28 1.48 0.21 0.34
small 
owner  
(0.5-1ha)
3.51 0.25 0.71 4.03 0.19 0.50 1.79 0.39 0.77
medium 
owner  (1-
2 ha)
3.55 0.38 1.02 5.39 0.28 1.29 2.12 0.6 1.55
large 
owner  
(2ha-5ha)
4.25 0.77 1.36 4.88 0.72 2.00 2.27 0.98 2.16
Very large 
owner 
(>5ha)
3.67 1.63 1.95 3.38 2.2 1.16 4.5 1.19 5.29
All owners 2.65 0.32 0.46 3.05 0.19 0.29 1.66 0.37 0.66
Post-intervention group farms
1.0 0.56 0.56 1.0 1.61 1.61 1.0 1.44 1.44
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015) and post intervention data 
from seasonal survey collected by field team as of Sep 2018
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Table 8: Winter and pre-monsoon fallow land pre-intervention and post-intervention
District Agricultural year Percentage 
winter fallow 
area 
Percentage pre-
monsoon fallow 
area 
2014-15 (pre-I) 33 97%Saptari
(Nepal)
2017-18 (post-I) 27 44%
2014-15 (pre-I) 33 96%Madhubani
(Bihar)
2017-18 (post-I 27 44%
2014-15 (pre-I) 82 NANorth 
Bengal
2017-18 (post-I) 43 NA
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015) and post-intervention data 
from seasonal survey collected by field team.
Notes: pre-I = pre-intervention; post-I = post-intervention
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Table 9: Nepal: some crop yields from pre-intervention and post-intervention period, until 
2018-19
Group Model Agricultural Year 
(from monsoon till 
summer)
Average yield 
per ha paddy
Average yield 
per ha wheat
Conventional 
farming by tenants 
2014-15 (pre-I) 3550 1775
Model 1 2016-17 (post-I) 3710 Wheat not 
cultivated
Koiladi 1
Model 3 2017-18 (post-I) 4730 1900
Land was not 
cultivated
2014-15 (pre-I) Land was 
uncultivated
Land was 
uncultivated
2016-17 (post-I) 590 1250
Kanakpatti 
group 1
Model 1 and 
Model 3 and 
different plots
2017-18 (post-I) 2150 1370
Land was not 
cultivated
2014-15 (pre-I) Land was 
uncultivated
Land was 
uncultivated
2016-17 (post-I) No data No data
Kanakpatti 
group 2
Model 1 and 
Model 3 and 
different plots
2017-18 (post-I) 3150 1010
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015) and post intervention data 
from seasonal survey collected by field team.
Notes: pre-I = pre-intervention; post-I = post-intervention
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Table 10: Bihar: some crop yields from pre-intervention and post-intervention period until 
2018-19
Group Model Agricultural Year 
(monsoon to summer)
Average paddy 
yields kg/ha 
Average wheat 
yields kg/ha 
Conventional 
farming by tenants 
2014-15 (pre-I) 3284 2282
Model 1 2016-17 (post-I) 2500 1940
2017-18 (post-I) 3100 2428
Bhagwatipur 
group 1 
Model 3
2018-19(post-I) 3700 no data
Conventional 
farming (owner 
cultivators)
2014-15 (pre-I) 3595 2205
2016-17 (post-I) 3825 2893
2017-18 (post-I) 3026 2800
Bhagwatipur 
group 2
Model 4
2018-19(post-I) 3717 no data
Conventional 
farming (owner 
cultivators)
2014-15  (pre-I) 3267 2200
2016-17 (post-I) 4443 3215
2017-18 (post-I) 3344 3227
Bhagwatipur 
group 3
Model 4
2018-19 (post-I) 3675 no data
Conventional 
farming (tenants) 
2014-15  (pre-I) 3136 2200
Model 1 2016-17 (post-I) 4083 1867
2017-18 (post-I) 2400 4150
Bhagwatipur 
group 4
Model 3
2018-19 (post-I) 3857 Wheat not 
cultivated
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015) and post-intervention data 
from seasonal survey collected by field team.
Notes: pre-I = pre-intervention; post-I = post-intervention
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Table 11: North Bengal: some crop yields from pre-intervention and post-intervention 
periods, till 2018-19
Group Model Agricultural Year 
(monsoon to summer)
Average paddy 
yield kg/ha 
Average potato yield 
kg/ha 
Conventional farming 
(owner cultivators) 
2014-15 (pre-I)) 1954 Potato not cultivated
2016-17 (post-I) not cultivated Potato not cultivated
2017-18 (post-I) 2680 Potato not cultivated
Uttar 
Chakoakheti 
1 Model 2
2018-19 (post-I) 2889 Potato not cultivated
Conventional farming 
(owner cultivators) 
2014-15 (pre-I) 2243 Potato not cultivated
2016-17(post-I) NA Potato not cultivated
2017-18 (post-I) 2677 13542
Uttar 
Chakoakheti 
2 Model 2
2018-19 (post-I) 2679 No data
Conventional farming 
(owner cultivators)
2014-15 (pre-I) 2108 Potato not cultivated
2016-17 (post-I) not cultivated 15424
2017-18 (post-I) 2165 Potato not cultivated
Uttar 
Chakoakheti  
3 Model 2
2018-19 (post-I) 2933 No data
Conventional farming 
(owner cultivators) 
2014-15 (pre-I) 2577 20108
2016-17 (post-I) not cultivated 25988
2017-18 (post-I) 4227 21809
Dholaguri 1
Model 2
2018-19 (post-I) 4128 28961
Conventional farming 
by owner cultivators 
2014-15 (pre-I) 2629 Potato not cultivated
2016-17 (post-I) not cultivated 25880
2017-18 (post-I) 3591 No data
Dholaguri 2
Model 2
2018-19 (post-I) 4881 28900
Conventional farming 
by owner cultivators 
2014-15 (pre-I) 2876 14638
2016-17 (post-I) not cultivated 26119
2017-18 (post-I) 3478 21877
Dholaguri 3
Model 2
2018-19 (post-I) 3934 28118
Source: Baseline census survey of village by research team (2015) and post-intervention data from 
seasonal survey collected by field team.
Notes: pre-I = pre-intervention; post-I = post-intervention
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Table 12: Regional characteristics and levels of cooperation
Characteristic supporting collective action North 
Bengal
Madhubani 
Bihar
Saptari 
Nepal
Per cent groups pursuing high levels of cooperation (models 
1 and 2) for all or part of the land  
100.0 28.0 40.0
Past experience of  pooling land, labour and production 
expenses 
yes none none
Average number of plots farmed per household in the 
village (baseline census) hectares
1.66 3.05 2.65
Active caste system in village no yes yes
Per cent households belonging to an indigenous or tribal 
community (baseline census)
36.4 0.0 82.2
Source: Baseline census and seasonal survey data collected by field team as of September 2018 
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